Monthly Archives: March 2025

G7: Foreign Ministers’ Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity

On 14 March 2025, the G7 Foreign Ministers (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union) issued a Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity. The Declaration covers a host of topics and practices of interest to the law of the sea, but select paragraphs include:

3.    We recognize the role of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal framework for governing all activities in the oceans and the seas.
[…]

5. Attempts to Change the Status Quo by Force: We oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force or coercion including in the East and South China Seas. We undertake to implement means through which to track systematically and report on attempts to change the status quo by force and by the establishment of new geographical facts, including through coercive and dangerous actions on the oceans and seas that might threaten regional and international peace and security. […]

6. Protecting Critical Maritime and Undersea Infrastructure: We are seized of the fact that vital energy and telecommunications infrastructure under the oceans and seas connects our economies and is vital to our prosperity. We recall the G7 Joint Statement on Cable Connectivity for Secure and Resilient Digital Communications Networks (2024) and the New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World (2024). We share a growing concern that undersea communications cables, subsea interconnectors and other critical undersea infrastructure have been subject to critical damage through sabotage, poor seamanship or irresponsible behaviour which have resulted in potential internet or energy disruption in affected regions, delays in global data transmission, or compromised sensitive communications. We will enhance our cooperation with industry mitigate risks, reduce bottlenecks to operational tasks while strengthening repair capacities in order to improve the overall resilience of critical undersea and maritime infrastructure. In this respect, we welcome the EU Action Plan on Cable Security adopted in February 2025 by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
[…]

10. Curtailing Unsafe and Illicit Shipping Practices: The rise of unsafe and illicit shipping practices, including fraudulent registration and registries, poses a significant threat to global trade and environmental sustainability. We are concerned that unsafe and illicit shipping imposes heavy costs on industry, governments and citizens […] We commit to strengthen our coordination, amongst the G7 and with other partners, to prevent the use of unregistered or fraudulently registered, uninsured and substandard vessels engaged in sanctions evasion, arms transfers, illegal fishing and illicit trade. We encourage relevant International Organizations to improve maritime domain awareness by expanding satellite-based vessel tracking and establishing comprehensive data records of the movement of individual ships and of ship-to-ship transfers, as a means of identifying and tracking illicit maritime activities. […]

11. Shadow Fleet Task Force: We invite members of the Nordic-Baltic 8 (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden), and possibly others, to join participating G7 members in a Shadow Fleet Task Force to enhance monitoring and detection and to otherwise constrain the use of shadow fleets engaged in illegal, unsafe or environmentally perilous activities, building on the work of others active in this area. The Task Force will constitute a response by the participating States to the call by the International Maritime Organization in its Resolution A.1192(33) of 6 December 2023 for Members States and all relevant stakeholders to promote actions to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by shadow fleets and their flag states, including illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanctions, evading compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs, or engaging in other illegal activities.
[…]

13. Promoting Safe and Resilient Ports and Strategic Waterways: […] We will work with partners and with relevant International Organizations to encourage robust cybersecurity standards for port ICT infrastructure, to increase resilience against malicious cyber incidents on maritime logistical networks, to reduce monopolistic power over key supply chain nodes, to promote secure and transparent port ownership, to limit unsolicited or undue foreign influence over critical infrastructures and strategic waterways, and to otherwise encourage greater focus on such potential vulnerabilities.

14. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) at sea poses a significant hazard to the marine environment, to the safety of fishermen and other users of the maritime space, and to various marine economic activities. We commit to enhancing diplomatic efforts and to exchanging best practices among national authorities, relevant international and regional organizations, and relevant industry sectors to accelerate the clean-up of UXO from the seas and ocean.
[…]

17. This G7 Maritime Security and Prosperity Declaration provides a framework for cooperation with non-G7 Partners, including countries hosting major ports, large merchant fleets, or extensive flag registries as well as relevant regional and International Organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization and ASEAN. We would welcome robust cooperation with Partners to take forward the goals set out in this Declaration, consistent with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, under the efforts of the G7 countries, including a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific region, to build a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law, and of commitment to the sustainable development of the world’s maritime spaces.

On 17 March 2025, A Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China Spokesperson offered remarks on the Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity, in particular surrounding the paragraphs addressing the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

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Vacancy: PhD Scholarship at the University of New South Wales

Law & Justice at the University of New South Wales (UNSW) Sydney is currently advertising a PhD candidate position, including scholarship, for a doctoral topic related to the Australian Research Council Discovery Project of Justine Nolan, Natalie Klein, and Shelley Marshall (RMIT University) on ‘Remedies for Victims of Modern Slavery in Indo-Pacific Fisheries’. Application are welcome until 31 March 2025. For more information and how to apply see here.

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Norway: WWF v. Norway (Ministry of Energy), Judgment

On 13 February 2025 the Oslo District Court issued judgment in Stiftelsen WWF Verdens Naturfond v. Staten v/ Energidepartementet (Case No. 24-081980TVI-TOSL/04). The case concerned the validity of the Royal Decree of 12 April 2024 on the opening of an area on the Norwegian Continental Shelf for mineral activities (previously reported). WWF challenged whether the mandatory impact assessment prior to opening of new areas on the continental shelf for mineral activities met the substantive requirements under Section 2-2 of the Seabed Minerals Act, as interpreted by other domestic and international law, including Article 206 of UNCLOS and the precautionary principle. The Decree was also challenged for being based on materially incorrect facts. The Decree was not invalidated, although WWF have signalled they will appeal the decision. On law of the sea:

It has not been alleged that Norway has not fulfilled its reporting obligations under Article 205 of [UNCLOS], or that the obligation to assess the potential environmental impacts ‘as far as practicable’ extends beyond the obligation to conduct an impact assessment under Section 2-2 of the [Seabed Minerals Act].

WWF v. Ministry of Energy, Judgment p. 26 (machine translation)

Overall, the district court finds that Norwegian law interpreted in accordance with international and national law requires that both probable and possible, but not theoretical or constructed, environmental consequences of an opening decision must be ‘illuminated’ in an impact assessment prepared by the ministry before the government can decide on new areas opened for mineral activities [Section 2-2 of the Seabed Minerals Act]. International law requirements indicate that the verb ‘illuminate’ means that the probable and possible environmental consequences must both be identified, described and assessed.

The impact assessment is obliged to use all available knowledge and assessment methods. Depending on the circumstances, new scientific studies may also be necessary where the knowledge base falls short […] The international and EU law investigation requirement is also not absolute, but is limited by a reasonableness, materiality, probability and/or proportionality limitation that, in the end, is not found to deviate significantly in content from the domestic law requirements.

WWF v. Ministry of Energy, Judgment pp. 30-31 (machine translation)

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China: Letter on Continental States’ “Archipelago” Baselines

On 28 February 2025, the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed a Letter to the UN Secretary-General which appears to largely be in response to the Letter dated 5 December 2024 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

In short, the USA Letter of 5 December 2024 referred to the 2022 study, Limits in the Seas No. 150, as well as 2022 State Practice Supplement, to emphasis the primary US position that the baseline provisions of UNCLOS are ‘comprehensive’, regulating the drawing of all baselines, including those pertaining to “continental States’ outlying archipelagos”. In the alternative, the US affirms that if the drawing of baselines pertaining to “continental States’ outlying archipelagos” is not regulated by the baseline provisions of UNCLOS, but rather customary international law, then the relevant rules of customary law must be demonstrative through State practice and opinio juris. The USA refutes that there is sufficient evidence in State practice and opinio juris to establish a customary legal basis for non-archipelagic States to establish straight baselines around outlying island groups.

The China Letter of 28 February 2025 affirms, first that the UNCLOS provisions on baselines are non-exhaustive and the “question of continental States’ outlying archipelagos was deferred”, and second, that the “practice regarding continental States’ outlying archipelagos [is] long-established in international law”. China rejects the findings of the US State Department Study, and affirms China’s position that the existing straight baselines at Xisha Qundao/Paracel Islands are consistent with international law and that “China has yet to draw its territorial sea baselines for other archipelagos”. To constitute an ‘archipelago’ in general international law, China suggests the maritime features must “constitute a legal whole”, with the conditions being “constitutes an entity in geographic, economic and political terms, and has been regarded as an entity respectively throughout history” (see, similarities to Article 46(b) of UNCLOS which defines archipelago for the purposes of UNCLOS).

Note, it is the shared position of both States, evident in the letters, that only Archipelagic States may establish archipelagic baselines, as provided in Part IV of UNCLOS. Continental States are by definition not Archipelagic States (Article 46 of UNCLOS) and therefore may not establish archipelagic baselines as governed by UNCLOS (Article 47 of UNCLOS; South China Sea Award (2016) para 573). The differences concern whether there are (a) lawful baselines circumstances outside of UNCLOS, and (b) whether this includes straight baselines around ‘archipelagos’ by Non-Archipelagic States (on both, note South China Sea Award (2016) paras 575-576).

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Viet Nam: Baselines in the Gulf of Bac Bo/Tonkin

On 21 February 2025, Viet Nam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the establishment of straight (Article 1; mainland territory) and normal (Article 2; Bach Long Vi Island) baselines in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Government of Viet Nam notes this practice was adopted in accordance with the 2012 Law of the Sea of Viet Nam. The Statement also defines the outer limit of Viet Nam’s territorial sea in the Gulf of Tonkin (Article 3), points 1-9 reflecting the territorial sea delimitation line with China, while point 10, according to the Statement, is “located within the waters of Viet Nam”. Consistent with the obligations of Viet Nam under Article 16 of UNCLOS, the list of geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, as well as a chart showing straight baselines and outer limits of the territorial sea, have been given due publicity and a copy deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 7 March 2025.

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EU: public consultation on the common fisheries policy regulation open

The European Commission (EC) opened a public consultation to gather evidence, insights, concerns, ideas, and feedback on the effectiveness of the common fisheries policy (CFP) regulation from a range of stakeholders, including individuals, the fisheries and maritime sectors, scientists, non-governmental and other organisations, and national administrations from EU Member States. The evaluation will build on previous consultations, such as the Commission communication on the common fisheries policy today and tomorrow (COM/2023/103). Input to this public consultation is open until until 21 April 2025 (see here). Further information available in the webpage of the EC.

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IMLI 2025 Course on Peaceful Dispute Settlement and Maritime Delimitation

The IMO International Maritime Law Institute (IMLI) is hosting the 2025 edition of its Course on Peaceful Settlement of Maritime Disputes and Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries. The Course seeks to provide a comprehensive introduction to, and an analysis of, various international maritime dispute settlement mechanisms as well as the boundary-making process and the alternative arrangements available to States, including provisional measures. Applications are open until 4 April 2025. More information is available here.

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EU: Action Plan on Cable Security

On 21 February 2025, the European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented a Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, entitled, EU Action Plan on Cable Security, with the objective of strengthening the security and resilience of submarine cables. Actions across the target areas will be of interest to ocean governance, including, for example deterrence measures against ‘shadow fleet’ vessels or other ‘vessels of interest’ and launching “a reflection at international level on how to make full use of the International Law of the Sea Framework to enhance the security of submarine cables”, including the possible establishment of “a common understanding of relevant provisions of the International law of the sea enabling Member States, as coastal and flag States, to more effectively protect critical infrastructure and take action in relation to the shadow fleet of vessels and any vessels of interests operating on the high seas. In particular, the legal framework for interception or boarding of vessels representing risks for the EU should be carefully assessed, in full compliance with United Nation Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)” (p. 16).

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