Author Archives: N.F. Coelho

On 21 May 2025, the District Court of The Hague ruled in a case brought by Stichting Environment and Fundamental Rights (the Foundation) against three companies from the Repsol Group over the 2022 oil spill off the coast of Peru (see case ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2025:8700). The Foundation, representing over 34,000 victims, claimed that Repsol Perú B.V. (Netherlands), Refinería La Pampilla S.A.A. (Peru), and Repsol S.A. (Spain) were jointly liable for the damage.

The applicants argued that Repsol Perú B.V. could serve as an “anchor defendant” under Article 8(1) Brussels I-bis and Article 7(1) Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (DCCP, or Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering), enabling the Dutch court to hear the claims against the other Repsol entities. It pointed to shareholding ties, overlapping directors, and strategic oversight as proof of a close connection. The Court rejected this. In paragraph 4.18 of its decision, it held that general corporate ties do not suffice to establish jurisdiction over foreign co-defendants. The Foundation failed to show concrete operational involvement by Repsol Perú B.V. in the Peruvian refinery or the oil spill. Therefore, the claims were not based on the same factual and legal grounds, and the Dutch court lacked jurisdiction over Repsol S.A. and La Pampilla.

The defendants argued that the Dutch court lacked jurisdiction based on the 1992 Civil Liability Convention (CLC). The court found that the CLC applies only to claims against the shipowner and does not exclude other claims under national law. However, it held that there was no sufficient connection between the claims against the Dutch entity and the foreign companies to justify jurisdiction over the latter. The court also rejected the argument that the Foundation was misusing Dutch civil procedure by avoiding the WAMCA collective action framework (Wet afwikkeling massaschade in collectieve actie). As a result, the court declared itself incompetent to hear the claims against the Peruvian and Spanish companies but allowed the case against Repsol Perú B.V. to proceed.

The ruling confirms that to invoke Article 8(1) Brussels I bis or Article 7(1) DCCP, claimants must demonstrate specific and direct involvement by the Dutch entity in the harmful acts, and not just corporate connections. Further information about the case, from the perspective of the applicants can be found here; the perspective of the defendants can be found here.

The Constitutional Court of Ecuador (Corte Constitucional del Ecuador) issued on November 28, 2024 a landmark decision in Case 95-20-IN. The Court dismissed a claim of unconstitutionality against Article 104 of the Organic Law for the Development of Aquaculture and Fishing (Ley Orgánica para el Desarrollo de la Acuicultura y Pesca, or LODAP). The article establishes an 8-mile coastal zone exclusive to artisanal fisheries, a move contested by members of the industrial fishing sector.

The claimants argued that the contested regulation was incompatible with the right to comprehensive nature conservation and the rights of nature to restoration, asserting that it established an exclusive 8-mile zone for artisanal fishing that limited the authority to implement necessary management measures to protect resources. They contended that the rigid zoning failed to allow adjustments based on scientific evidence, potentially leading to anthropogenic disasters and species extinction, and conflicted with the State’s obligation to implement precautionary measures. The claimants also emphasized that the State must ensure natural cycles and functions through technically supported, sustainable fishing regulations, which they believed the contested regulation failed to achieve.

The Court upheld the 8-mile zone exclusively for artisanal fishing, ruling it consistent with constitutional principles, including the rights of marine-coastal ecosystems, the principle of prevention, and the right to economic activities. It recognized the zoning as a legislative policy grounded in scientific data, aimed at protecting nature, human bioconnected rights, and the artisanal fishing economy. The Court also emphasized that decisions on modifying the zone’s extent are technical matters for the legislature, not within its jurisdiction to evaluate. Overall, the Court concluded that, in abstract terms, the contested provision aligns with constitutional principles, recognizing en passant that marine-coastal ecosystems are holders of rights:

50. Este Organismo no puede dejar de observar la interdependencia que existe entre el derecho de los ecosistemas marinos-costeros de respeto integral a su existencia y la regeneración de los ciclos vitales de las especies que habitan en ellos con su equilibrio ecológico, así como con la vida en armonía con la naturaleza. En esta línea, la protección de estos ecosistemas no solo resulta fundamental a fin de preservar un espacio para la reproducción y desarrollo de los elementos que habitan en ellos. Al contrario, la justificación de esta protección radica en el compromiso de “construir una nueva forma de convivencia ciudadana, en diversidad y armonía con la naturaleza […]”. Aquello, implica la posibilidad de limitar actividades antrópicas con el objetivo de velar por el equilibrio de las cadenas tróficas.

55. Los ecosistemas marinos-costeros son titulares de los derechos reconocidos a la naturaleza. Esta protección, al igual que otros derechos constitucionales, encuentra sus límites. La propia Constitución prevé la posibilidad de que se realicen actividades pesqueras. Sin embargo, estas deben estar reguladas para que sean sostenibles y respeten los ciclos, funciones, estructuras y procesos evolutivos de los ecosistemas marino-costeros, así como su conservación y restauración, a fin de velar por los derechos de la naturaleza y el equilibrio de las cadenas tróficas. De ahí que se establezcan tipos de pesca, espacios para realizarla y zonas de conservación de acuerdo con las características de dichos ecosistemas.

63. Bajo esta consideración, la autoridad competente, al emitir las resoluciones correspondientes, tiene la obligación de garantizar que las actividades pesqueras en esta zona no vulneren los derechos de este ecosistema. Por lo tanto, debe realizar un ejercicio estricto al verificar el cumplimiento de requisitos constitucionales, legales e infralegales y anticipar la responsabilidad que podría implicar la emisión de directrices que impliquen vulneraciones de derechos constitucionales por no haber adoptado las previsiones necesarias.

This decision has the practical effect of recognizing that the Ecuadorian Constitutional Rights of Nature, as enshrined in the Chapter 7 of the Constitution of Ecuador (Articles 71-74), also apply to its maritime domain.

The complete version of this decision is available in Spanish on the website of the Court.

The English Court of Appeal rendered judgment in the dispute between salvors and the shipowners as to whether a salvage contract on commercial terms had been made in connection with the re-floating of the “Ever Given” in the Suez Canal in March 2021 (SMIT Salvage & Ors v. Luster Maritime SA & Anr (The Ever Given) [2024] EWCA Civ 260).

The appellants, the owners of the ‘Ever Given’, contended that such a contract was concluded, leaving other contractual terms to be agreed at a later stage (although they never were), and that its effect is to preclude a claim for salvage under the International Convention on Salvage 1989 or at common law. The salvors said that no such contract was concluded and that they are therefore able to bring their claim for salvage services rendered, with the quantum of their claim to be determined by the Admiralty Court. The Admiralty judge held that no such contract was concluded. He did so on the ground that although what the parties agreed was capable of amounting to a contract as to the remuneration payable to the salvors for any services which they provided, the parties did not on an objective view intend that agreement to be legally binding until the remaining terms (including as to what services the salvors would provide) were also agreed. See Admiralty Court judgment, dated 30 March 2023, here.

The English Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the owners highlighting that several issues had not been agreed, including “such basic matters as the nature of the services which SMIT would provide, the standard of care which it would be required to exercise, and the payment terms, and left it for future agreement a detailed contract on the Wreckhire 2010 form”. The court found that the owners did not demonstrate an unequivocal intention to be legally bound, based on the parties’ exchanges; that the ultimatums do not undermine the analysis that no binding contract was formed; and that although the urgency to finalize the contract diminished after the remuneration terms were agreed upon, SMIT’s strong position and likelihood of a salvage award defused the urgency, indicating no prior binding agreement on remuneration terms alone. As the court agreed with the Admiralty judge’s conclusion that no binding contract was formed, it found it unnecessary to consider the standard of review on appeal. See Court of Appeal judgment, dated 19 March 2024, here.

On 28 November 2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union (General Court) issued an order in Case T-600/22 (ST v European Border and Coast Guard Agency), addressing allegations of unlawful inaction by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in the context of asylum rights and regulatory procedures (Article 46(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896). The applicant, ST, sought a declaration of Frontex’s failure to act or, alternatively, the annulment of Frontex’s decision refusing to suspend or terminate activities in the Aegean Sea. The dispute arose from an NGO’s invitation to Frontex, representing an anonymous individual and seeking action regarding Frontex’s Aegean Sea activities. However, the Court found the action inadmissible on the grounds that ST failed to demonstrate being the anonymous person behind the pre-litigation invitation, and lacked a vested, present interest in the annulment of Frontex’s decision. The Court dismissed the action entirely, citing ST’s inability to prove identity and establish the decision’s direct impact on his situation. The order can be read here.