Category Archives: Jurisprudence

On 21 May 2025, the District Court of The Hague ruled in a case brought by Stichting Environment and Fundamental Rights (the Foundation) against three companies from the Repsol Group over the 2022 oil spill off the coast of Peru (see case ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2025:8700). The Foundation, representing over 34,000 victims, claimed that Repsol Perú B.V. (Netherlands), Refinería La Pampilla S.A.A. (Peru), and Repsol S.A. (Spain) were jointly liable for the damage.

The applicants argued that Repsol Perú B.V. could serve as an “anchor defendant” under Article 8(1) Brussels I-bis and Article 7(1) Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (DCCP, or Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering), enabling the Dutch court to hear the claims against the other Repsol entities. It pointed to shareholding ties, overlapping directors, and strategic oversight as proof of a close connection. The Court rejected this. In paragraph 4.18 of its decision, it held that general corporate ties do not suffice to establish jurisdiction over foreign co-defendants. The Foundation failed to show concrete operational involvement by Repsol Perú B.V. in the Peruvian refinery or the oil spill. Therefore, the claims were not based on the same factual and legal grounds, and the Dutch court lacked jurisdiction over Repsol S.A. and La Pampilla.

The defendants argued that the Dutch court lacked jurisdiction based on the 1992 Civil Liability Convention (CLC). The court found that the CLC applies only to claims against the shipowner and does not exclude other claims under national law. However, it held that there was no sufficient connection between the claims against the Dutch entity and the foreign companies to justify jurisdiction over the latter. The court also rejected the argument that the Foundation was misusing Dutch civil procedure by avoiding the WAMCA collective action framework (Wet afwikkeling massaschade in collectieve actie). As a result, the court declared itself incompetent to hear the claims against the Peruvian and Spanish companies but allowed the case against Repsol Perú B.V. to proceed.

The ruling confirms that to invoke Article 8(1) Brussels I bis or Article 7(1) DCCP, claimants must demonstrate specific and direct involvement by the Dutch entity in the harmful acts, and not just corporate connections. Further information about the case, from the perspective of the applicants can be found here; the perspective of the defendants can be found here.

The Constitutional Court of Ecuador (Corte Constitucional del Ecuador) issued on November 28, 2024 a landmark decision in Case 95-20-IN. The Court dismissed a claim of unconstitutionality against Article 104 of the Organic Law for the Development of Aquaculture and Fishing (Ley Orgánica para el Desarrollo de la Acuicultura y Pesca, or LODAP). The article establishes an 8-mile coastal zone exclusive to artisanal fisheries, a move contested by members of the industrial fishing sector.

The claimants argued that the contested regulation was incompatible with the right to comprehensive nature conservation and the rights of nature to restoration, asserting that it established an exclusive 8-mile zone for artisanal fishing that limited the authority to implement necessary management measures to protect resources. They contended that the rigid zoning failed to allow adjustments based on scientific evidence, potentially leading to anthropogenic disasters and species extinction, and conflicted with the State’s obligation to implement precautionary measures. The claimants also emphasized that the State must ensure natural cycles and functions through technically supported, sustainable fishing regulations, which they believed the contested regulation failed to achieve.

The Court upheld the 8-mile zone exclusively for artisanal fishing, ruling it consistent with constitutional principles, including the rights of marine-coastal ecosystems, the principle of prevention, and the right to economic activities. It recognized the zoning as a legislative policy grounded in scientific data, aimed at protecting nature, human bioconnected rights, and the artisanal fishing economy. The Court also emphasized that decisions on modifying the zone’s extent are technical matters for the legislature, not within its jurisdiction to evaluate. Overall, the Court concluded that, in abstract terms, the contested provision aligns with constitutional principles, recognizing en passant that marine-coastal ecosystems are holders of rights:

50. Este Organismo no puede dejar de observar la interdependencia que existe entre el derecho de los ecosistemas marinos-costeros de respeto integral a su existencia y la regeneración de los ciclos vitales de las especies que habitan en ellos con su equilibrio ecológico, así como con la vida en armonía con la naturaleza. En esta línea, la protección de estos ecosistemas no solo resulta fundamental a fin de preservar un espacio para la reproducción y desarrollo de los elementos que habitan en ellos. Al contrario, la justificación de esta protección radica en el compromiso de “construir una nueva forma de convivencia ciudadana, en diversidad y armonía con la naturaleza […]”. Aquello, implica la posibilidad de limitar actividades antrópicas con el objetivo de velar por el equilibrio de las cadenas tróficas.

55. Los ecosistemas marinos-costeros son titulares de los derechos reconocidos a la naturaleza. Esta protección, al igual que otros derechos constitucionales, encuentra sus límites. La propia Constitución prevé la posibilidad de que se realicen actividades pesqueras. Sin embargo, estas deben estar reguladas para que sean sostenibles y respeten los ciclos, funciones, estructuras y procesos evolutivos de los ecosistemas marino-costeros, así como su conservación y restauración, a fin de velar por los derechos de la naturaleza y el equilibrio de las cadenas tróficas. De ahí que se establezcan tipos de pesca, espacios para realizarla y zonas de conservación de acuerdo con las características de dichos ecosistemas.

63. Bajo esta consideración, la autoridad competente, al emitir las resoluciones correspondientes, tiene la obligación de garantizar que las actividades pesqueras en esta zona no vulneren los derechos de este ecosistema. Por lo tanto, debe realizar un ejercicio estricto al verificar el cumplimiento de requisitos constitucionales, legales e infralegales y anticipar la responsabilidad que podría implicar la emisión de directrices que impliquen vulneraciones de derechos constitucionales por no haber adoptado las previsiones necesarias.

This decision has the practical effect of recognizing that the Ecuadorian Constitutional Rights of Nature, as enshrined in the Chapter 7 of the Constitution of Ecuador (Articles 71-74), also apply to its maritime domain.

The complete version of this decision is available in Spanish on the website of the Court.

On 12 November 2024 the Amsterdam Court of Appeal issued judgment in appeal summary proceedings concerning the previously reported preliminary relief in Nauru Ocean Resources Inc (NORI) v. Stichting Greenpeace Council and Stichting Phoenix (ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2024:3127). In confirming the judgment under appeal and rejecting an incidental appeal two matters of principal interest to the law of the sea were addressed.

First, in rejecting an incidental appeal by Greenpeace concerning NORI being inadmissible as only representing the interest of its parent company (The Metals Company (TMC)), the court confirmed “NORI, as a contractual party of [International Seabed Authority] ISA in the contract from which the research on the seabed by COCO in [the NORI-D Contract Area of the Clarion Clipperton Zone] arises, has a legally respectable interest in the claims” (para. 4.4).

Second, in rejecting NORI’s appeal on the dismissal of its second claim in the first instance, that Greenpeace “be prohibited from being within a radius of 500 metres around the COCO for a period of six months after service of the judgment and from taking or facilitating unlawful and obstructive actions there, as long as the COCO is located in the Clarion Clipperton Zone” (para 4.1), the court found that the claim is “inadmissible because there is no urgent interest in it” (para 4.5). The deployment of the COCO to the Clarion Clipperton Zone in the foreseeable future was currently a “purely hypothetical situation”, as was the “need for clarity about the admissibility of any future protest actions by Greenpeace with a view to the budget and planning of new deployment of the COCO” (para 4.5).

However, the court also made several interesting observations on protests at sea when discussing the second claim, affirming the application of both the law of the sea and human rights law, but distinguishing the legal aspects raised by protests in the vicinity of a foreign vessel from those conducted on board a vessel flying a flag of a contracting party to a relevant human rights treaty:

Claim II amounts to a general ban on Greenpeace et al. from carrying out a protest action within a radius of 500 metres from the COCO (as the court understands: in [place], although this is not stated in the conclusion on appeal) for a period of six months (after service of the judgment). As the court assumes, NORI is referring to an action such as that carried out by Greenpeace at the end of 2023 on the high seas against deep-sea mining, with the ARCTIC SUNRISE, canoes and motorised rubber dinghies in close proximity to the COCO and with action on board the COCO.

It is rightly not disputed that the question of whether a protest action on the high seas on board the COCO sailing under the Danish flag, as a result of which Danish law applies on board, must be answered on the basis of Article 10 and/or 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

With regard to a protest action by the ARCTIC SUNRISE, the canoes and the motorised rubber dinghies on the high seas in the vicinity of (but not on board) the COCO, this question must be answered on the basis of the relevant rules of maritime law. Protest actions at sea are considered to be a lawful use of the sea linked to the freedom of navigation as referred to in Article 87, paragraph 1, introductory phrase and (a), of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (cf. ARCTIC SUNRISE Arbitration, PCA case no. 2014-02, Award on the Merits, 14 August 2015, par. 227). The right to protest on the high seas derives from the internationally recognised freedoms of expression and association, as laid down, inter alia, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the ECHR. Whether a protest on the high seas is permissible depends on the facts and circumstances of the specific case. The right to protest on the high seas is limited by the relevant maritime law, which serves, among other things, the safety and freedom of use of the sea and from which it follows that only peaceful protest actions are permitted (Article 88 UNCLOS). The precise content of the maritime law that is (potentially) relevant here – including the question of whether the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) is relevant in this context – can be left undiscussed.

NORI v. Greenpeace & Phoenix (Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 200.337.542/01), para 4.5

For further context, see the Greenpeace and TMC responses following judgment.

Following the previously reported Decision on Challenges and resignation of two arbitrators in the Dispute Concerning the Detention of Ukrainian Naval Vessels and Servicemen (Ukraine v. the Russian Federation), on 8 August 2024 the President of ITLOS, following consultations, appointed Mr James Kateka (United Republic of Tanzania) and Ms Joanna Mossop (New Zealand) to fill the vacancies (UNCLOS, Annex VII, Art 3(e)-(f)), as well as appointing Mr Gudmundur Eiriksson (Iceland) as president of the Arbitral Tribunal (UNCLOS, Annex VII, Art 3(e)-(f)).

The appointments follow previous developments under the Arbitral Tribunal, whereby, among others, the Russian Federation had requested the Arbitral Tribunal “proceed with a ruling in respect of the proper procedure for appointment of replacement arbitrators” (Procedural Order No. 9, para 1). The Arbitral Tribunal noted “that the Parties disagree on the proper interpretation and application of Article 3 of Annex VII to the Convention and the Rules of Procedure [..and..] notes especially its reference to the desirability of agreement between the Parties” (Procedural Order No. 9, paras 45-46). While progress was made, no agreement between the Parties on the appointment of replacement arbitrators was reached (Procedural Order No. 9, paras 17-22). In proceeding with the request, the analysis of the Arbitral Tribunal stated:

39. Professor McRae and Judge Wolfrum were appointed as members of the Arbitral Tribunal, and Professor McRae as its President, by the ITLOS President. Thus, in accordance with Article 3, subparagraph (e), of Annex VII, “the manner prescribed for [their] initial appointment” under subparagraph (f) for filling the vacancies resulting from the successful challenges to Professor McRae and Judge Wolfrum is that outlined in Article 3, subparagraph (e).
[…]
43. In Article 6 of its Rules of Procedure, the Arbitral Tribunal chose to deal with the application of the term in Article 3, subparagraph (e), of Annex VII to the Convention, “the manner prescribed for [their] initial appointment”, in the case of filling a vacancy in the event of withdrawal, incapacity or death of an arbitrator […]
44. Notably, Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Procedure does not refer to the event of disqualification of an arbitrator upon a successful challenge by a Party.

Procedural Order No. 9, paras 39-44

The Arbitral Tribunal ultimately concluded in Procedural Order No. 9 of 18 July 2024:

48. In its request for a ruling, the Russian Federation has not identified any question of procedure which, in the terms of Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Arbitral Tribunal, “is not expressly governed by these Rules [of Procedure] or by Annex VII to the Convention or other provisions of the Convention”, and the Arbitral Tribunal will not rule, in the abstract, on questions outside this scope.
49. Ukraine has now applied to the ITLOS President to appoint replacements for Professor McRae and Judge Wolfrum. It is not for this Arbitral Tribunal to comment on how the ITLOS President should respond to that request.
50. Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, the Acting President and the other members of the Arbitral Tribunal, by a majority of two to one, reject the request of the Russian Federation that the Arbitral Tribunal rule on the procedure for the appointment of replacement arbitrators.

Procedural Order No. 9, paras 48-50

Professor Vylegzhanin appended a Dissenting Opinion to Procedural Order No. 9 (not yet publicly available).

The English Court of Appeal rendered judgment in the dispute between salvors and the shipowners as to whether a salvage contract on commercial terms had been made in connection with the re-floating of the “Ever Given” in the Suez Canal in March 2021 (SMIT Salvage & Ors v. Luster Maritime SA & Anr (The Ever Given) [2024] EWCA Civ 260).

The appellants, the owners of the ‘Ever Given’, contended that such a contract was concluded, leaving other contractual terms to be agreed at a later stage (although they never were), and that its effect is to preclude a claim for salvage under the International Convention on Salvage 1989 or at common law. The salvors said that no such contract was concluded and that they are therefore able to bring their claim for salvage services rendered, with the quantum of their claim to be determined by the Admiralty Court. The Admiralty judge held that no such contract was concluded. He did so on the ground that although what the parties agreed was capable of amounting to a contract as to the remuneration payable to the salvors for any services which they provided, the parties did not on an objective view intend that agreement to be legally binding until the remaining terms (including as to what services the salvors would provide) were also agreed. See Admiralty Court judgment, dated 30 March 2023, here.

The English Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the owners highlighting that several issues had not been agreed, including “such basic matters as the nature of the services which SMIT would provide, the standard of care which it would be required to exercise, and the payment terms, and left it for future agreement a detailed contract on the Wreckhire 2010 form”. The court found that the owners did not demonstrate an unequivocal intention to be legally bound, based on the parties’ exchanges; that the ultimatums do not undermine the analysis that no binding contract was formed; and that although the urgency to finalize the contract diminished after the remuneration terms were agreed upon, SMIT’s strong position and likelihood of a salvage award defused the urgency, indicating no prior binding agreement on remuneration terms alone. As the court agreed with the Admiralty judge’s conclusion that no binding contract was formed, it found it unnecessary to consider the standard of review on appeal. See Court of Appeal judgment, dated 19 March 2024, here.

On 21 May 2024, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) delivered its Advisory Opinion on the Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Tribunal). The operative clause provides:

Judges Jesus, Pawlak, Kulyk, Kittichaisaree and Infante Caffi availed themselves of the right to attach individual Declarations to the Advisory Opinion of the Tribunal.

The Arbitral Tribunal (UNCLOS, Annex VII) in respect of the Dispute Concerning the Detention of Ukrainian Naval Vessels and Servicemen (Ukraine v. the Russian Federation), PCA Case No. 2019-28, issued its Decision on Challenges on 6 March 2024. In accordance with Article 19(1) of the Rules of Procedure (22 November 2019) and Paragraph 7 of Procedural Order No. 8 (15 December 2023), the Decision on Challenges is issued by the three unchallenged Members by majority vote [Decision on Challenges, para. 1].

On 17 October 2023 the Russian Federation brought to the Arbitral Tribunal’s attention the fact that Professor McRae and Judge Wolfrum had voted, as members of the Institute of International Law (IDI), in favour of the Declaration of The Institute of International Law on Aggression In Ukraine (1 March 2022), arguing this raised impartiality concerns contrary to Sections 4.7-4.8 of the Terms of Appointment (22 November 2019) [Decision on Challenges, paras. 27, 31]. The Russian Federation submitted its Statement of Challenges on 24 November 2023, requesting the tribunal devise a procedure for deciding on the challenges and requesting the disqualification of Professor McRae and Judge Wolfrum as arbitrators [Decision on Challenges, para. 36]. Procedural Order No. 8 (15 December 2023) established the procedure for a decision on the challenges, while Procedural Order No. 7 (1 December 2023) extended the remaining written submission deadlines and reserved the week of 27 May 2024 for hearings on the merits.

On the standard of independence and impartiality, the Tribunal noted UNCLOS, the Terms of Appointment and the Rules of Procedure “indicate certain general principles pertaining to the qualifications of arbitrators”, while a Tribunal in the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Reasoned Decision on Challenge, para. 166) was able to derive the applicable standard for upholding a challenge for lack of independence and impartiality in inter-State arbitration proceeding [Decision on Challenges, para. 87-89]. The “justifiable doubts” standard is an objective standard and the Tribunal agreed with the exhortation to adhere to “the standards applicable to inter-State cases” [Decision on Challenges, paras. 90-92].

The Tribunal continued:

[A] timeliness requirement can be derived from and applied on the basis of the general requirement of good faith, and the international law rules of waiver and acquiescence, both manifestly applicable to arbitral proceedings under Annex VII to UNCLOS. There may also be a stage when bringing such a challenge would impinge on the fair administration of justice and the principles of the equality of the Parties. Such rules […] bar a State from exercising rights that it failed to assert promptly, i.e. that it consciously refrained from exercising within a reasonable period of time.

Decision on Challenges, paras. 98-99

On the specific Challenge to Professor McRae and Judge Wolfrum, the Tribunal decided:

Sir Christopher Greenwood attached a Dissenting Opinion (6 March 2024), agreeing with the substantive standards to be applied in deciding on challenges in this case, but disagreeing with its application to the facts of the case. Greenwood posits “The IDI Declaration addressed different events, occurring later in time, and of a fundamentally different character from those with which the Tribunal is concerned. Nor do the rules and principles of international law to which the Declaration refers have any bearing on the decisions which the Tribunal will have to take in the present case.” [Dissenting Opinion, para. 10]. Greenwood also concludes that the challenge was untimely, given Russia’s awareness of the IDI Declaration since Spring of 2022 and its failure in inquire on arbitrators voting records if Russia viewed the IDI Declaration as relevant to proceedings [Dissenting Opinion, paras. 15-19].

On 22 December 2023 the Aribitral Tribunal (ICSID Convention) rendered its Award in Peteris Pildegovics and SIA North Star v. Kingdom of Norway (ICSID Case No. ARB/20/11). The dispute arose “out of measures taken by the Respondent regarding the alleged restriction of the fishing of snow crab in certain zones over which Norway exercises certain sovereign rights, which allegedly undermined the Claimants’ investments in snow crab fishing, resulting in a loss to their investment” (Award, para. 5). Findings, among others, include:

In the present case, the Tribunal is not entitled to rule on the dispute between the different parties to the Svalbard Treaty on whether or not Article 2 of that Treaty requires Norway to allow nationals of the other States parties access to hunting and fishing resources on the continental shelf around Svalbard (para. 295; see further paras 582-585).

Since the Claimants are claiming only for alleged breaches of the BIT [Latvia – Norway BIT (1992)], it is the BIT which the Tribunal must apply. In doing so, it can consider — if it is necessary to do so — the other treaties invoked [Svalbard Treaty, UNCLOS and the NEAFC Convention], as well as other rules of international law. However, whether a provision of one of those treaties is relevant to the determination of whether Norway has breached a provision of the BIT is not a matter on which it is safe to generalise; that question must be considered in the context of the specific facts and allegation raised (para. 448).

The Tribunal agrees with Norway that whether the snow crab is a sedentary species is a matter of law, namely whether it falls within the definition in Article 77(4) [UNCLOS], and that no designation is required (para. 489).

First, while the Tribunal is not called upon to decide whether or not the snow crab is a sedentary species within the UNCLOS definition, Norway’s conclusion that it is a sedentary species cannot be regarded as an outlier…Secondly, such scientific assessment as has been shown to the Tribunal tends to support the conclusion that, at the harvestable stage, snow crab “are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed” (paras 480-481).

The duty to act in good faith in the exercise of a State’s power is expressly provided for in Article 300 of UNCLOS…The Tribunal does not accept that Norway’s treatment of the status of snow crab was arbitrary or that it demonstrated a lack of good faith…Nor can Norway be faulted for the procedure which it followed…That leaves the question whether, once Norway had concluded that snow crab is sedentary, its action in imposing a ban on taking snow crab in the Norwegian sector of the Loop Hole was arbitrary or amounted to a lack of good faith within the meaning of Article 300 of UNCLOS or customary international law. The Tribunal does not accept that that was the case (paras 534-539).

[T]he Tribunal accepts that a State which uses a power that it possesses for an extraneous, improper purpose may be considered to have acted arbitrarily and in abusive or bad faith manner… It is essential, however, to be clear what is the purpose of the power which the State is accused of exercising improperly. In the case of the powers of the coastal State over the resources of the continental shelf, Articles 77(1) and (2) of UNCLOS make clear that those rights are conferred for the purpose of enabling the coastal State to enjoy the benefit of the resources of the continental shelf…The Claimants have argued that Norway acted in order to exclude the EU vessels harvesting snow crab on its continental shelf and reserve the resource for its own fishing industry, but that is exactly what Article 77 provides for. There is nothing extraneous or improper in Norway acting in this way. Nor is there anything wrong with it using its sovereign rights as a bargaining chip with the EU which has done the same in relation to marine resources in the continental shelves and EEZs of its Member States (paras 541-543).

Peteris Pildegovics and SIA North Star v. Kingdom of Norway, Award of 22 December 2023

As previously noted, on 30 November 2023 the Court of Amsterdam issued a preliminary relief order in summary proceedings, Nauru Ocean Resources Inc (NORI) v. Stichting Greenpeace Council and Stichting Phoenix (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2023:7600). The court noted that NORI was conducting a post-disturbance monitoring campaign in the NORI-D Contract Area and NORI requested Greenpeace “maintain a safe distance of at least 500 meters from our research vessel to ensure the safety and well-being of all personnel at sea” (paras 2.2, 2.7, 2.10). Greenpeace informed NORI it was “undertaking a peaceful protest at sea” and established direct communication channels (paras 2.6, 2.8).

Greenpeace kayaks, dispatched from the Arctic Sunrise (Netherlands flag) mothership, regularly sailed around the Coco (Denmark flag), attaching a banner to a cable and hindering the loading and unloading of research material from the Coco. Subsequently, four persons from the Arctic Sunrise boarded the Coco without authorization and without intent to leave the vessel in the short term, establishing themselves on the A-frame used to launch/return submersibles, disrupting NORI activities. Having pressed an emergency button, the vessel could not safely move.

The court made a number of observations:

• The court affirmed Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights affirms Greenpeace’s right to take action and make its opinion known to the public, subject to restrictions provided for by law which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of inter alia national security, public safety, the prevention of disorder and criminal offences, the protection of health or morals and the protection of the rights of others. However, the Coco is not a public space, but private property, so NORI does not in principle have to tolerate the presence of the activists there, unless Greenpeace has compelling interests in doing so.
• Greenpeace is primarily concerned with publicity about its actions. After a week, Greenpeace’s interest in continuing this occupation is limited as plenty of publicity opportunities arose, while NORI’s interest in its responsibilities concerning the safety of all those present on the Coco remain pertinent. The interest in preventing a serious accident outweighs Greenpeace’s interest in continuing the action on the Coco…in addition, the presence of the activists slows down the progress of the investigation.
• Serious damage to the ship by Greenpeace activists has not occurred and an order for Greenpeace persons to leave the Coco will reduce the nuisance. A certain degree of inconvenience when conducting protest actions is inevitable. Therefore, a claim seeking an injunction to prevent Greenpeace defacing, damaging, impeding or hindering in any way the conduct of NORI’s investigations and Coco’s navigation was rejected.
• The requested order to cease all possible actions with regard to the Coco goes much further than is necessary for the purpose to be achieved and is therefore rejected.
• NORI‘s demand that Greenpeace be prohibited from being within a radius of 500 meters around the Coco for a period of six months and from taking or facilitating unlawful or nuisance actions therein as long as the Coco is in the Clarion Clipperton Zone would ban future actions by Greenpeace, which cannot be assumed in advance to be unlawful. Actions on the open sea within a radius of 500 meters around the Coco are not unlawful in advance.
• The immediate measures of a temporary nature issued by the Secretary-General of ISA, included a call to maintain a safety distance of at least 500 meters from the Coco, but this is not an enforceable measure, and it is unclear to what extent this authority is authorized to actually impose the aforementioned measures on (in this case) Greenpeace.
• Regulation 6 of the Convention on International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) provides no basis that Greenpeace should maintain a distance of 500 meters around the Coco.
• While Greenpeace must comply with applicable law and regulations, including COLREGS, imposing a ban on Greenpeace from being located within a radius of 500 meters around the Coco, without there being concrete indications of the necessity, is too great an infringement of Greenpeace’s right to take action. 

• The operative part of the decision provides:
  • 5.1 Orders Greenpeace with immediate effect to order its people to disembark from the Coco;
  • 5.2 Orders Greenpeace to pay NORI a penalty of €50,000.00 for each day that it fails to comply with the requirements referred to in 5.1, up to a maximum of €500,000.00.

As previously reported, Greenpeace complied with the order.

On 28 November 2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union (General Court) issued an order in Case T-600/22 (ST v European Border and Coast Guard Agency), addressing allegations of unlawful inaction by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in the context of asylum rights and regulatory procedures (Article 46(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896). The applicant, ST, sought a declaration of Frontex’s failure to act or, alternatively, the annulment of Frontex’s decision refusing to suspend or terminate activities in the Aegean Sea. The dispute arose from an NGO’s invitation to Frontex, representing an anonymous individual and seeking action regarding Frontex’s Aegean Sea activities. However, the Court found the action inadmissible on the grounds that ST failed to demonstrate being the anonymous person behind the pre-litigation invitation, and lacked a vested, present interest in the annulment of Frontex’s decision. The Court dismissed the action entirely, citing ST’s inability to prove identity and establish the decision’s direct impact on his situation. The order can be read here.

The International Court of Justice handed down on 13 July 2023 its Judgment in the case concerning Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia). In the Application instituting proceedings, filed in September 2013, Nicaragua requested the Court to delimit the boundaries between, on the one hand, the continental shelf of Nicaragua beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured and, on the other hand, the continental shelf of Colombia (see previous post).

In the operative clause of its Judgment, the Court:

1) Rejects the request made by the Republic of Nicaragua that the Court adjudge and declare that the maritime boundary between the Republic of Nicaragua and the Republic of Colombia in the areas of the continental shelf which, according to the Republic of Nicaragua, appertain to each of them beyond the boundary determined by the Court in its Judgment of 19 November 2012 [in the case concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)] follows geodetic lines connecting the points 1 to 8, the co-ordinates of which are referred to in paragraph 19 [of the Judgment];

2) Rejects the request made by the Republic of Nicaragua that the Court adjudge and declare that the islands of San Andrés and Providencia are entitled to a continental shelf up to a line consisting of 200-nautical-mile arcs from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured connecting the points A, C and B, the co-ordinates of which are referred to in paragraph 19 [of the Judgment];

3) Rejects the request made by the Republic of Nicaragua with respect to the maritime entitlements of Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo.

The text of the Judgment, the summary and the court’s press release may be found here.

On 27 June 2023 the European Court of Human Rights (Chamber) delivered its Judgment in Bryan and Others v. Russia (Application no. 22515/14), which concerned the 2013 attempted protest action by Greenpeace & others at the Prirazlomnaya offshore oil drilling platform, located in the Pechora Sea within the exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) of the Russian Federation, including their subsequent arrest and detention. The applicants complaint concerned a breach of Article 5 (right to liberty and security) and Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The situation had also given rise to separate arbitration between the Netherlands and Russia under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as a settlement agreement (see previous reporting and The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia)).

In Bryan and Others v. Russia, observations were submitted by the applicants and Russia. Comments were also submitted by the Netherlands, Sweden and Ukraine, whose nationals were involved, as well as two NGOs given leave to intervene, Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI) and ARTICLE 19. The nationals of Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, Türkiye and the United Kingdom were involved, but these governments chose to not submit any comments.

The Judgment in Bryan and Others v. Russia found:

A Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Serghides is in favour of all the operative elements of the Judgment, but dissents on an element of the reasoning provided for not granting the applicants any monetary amount in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

On 1 July 2023 a Review Panel established under Article 17 and Annex II of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean (Review Panel) issued its Findings and Recommendations with regards to the objection by the Russian Federation to the Conservation and Management Measure for Trachurus murphyi (CMM 01-2023) adopted by the Commission of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) at its Eleventh Meeting (7-17 February 2023). On 10 April 2023 Russia objected to the determination of its share in the total allowable catch (“TAC”) of Trachurus murphyi in 2023 (Findings and Recommendations, para 4). On 20 April 2023 China also objected to the determination of its share in the TAC of Trachurus murphyi in 2023, but withdrew its objection to CMM 01-2023 shortly after issuance of Procedural Directive No. 1 by the Review Panel (Findings and Recommendations, paras 5, 16 and para 20 on allocation of expenses; unpublished Final Decision of the Review Panel as Comprised of Five Members (7 June 2023)). The South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation, Russia, Chinese Taipei, European Union, New Zealand, Chile and Peru participated in the written phase of proceedings, while the Hearing was attended (in-person/remotely) by Chile, Chinese Taipei, Russia, China, Denmark (in respect of the Faroe Islands), the Organisation and Peru, with oral interventions by Chile and Russia.

The Findings and Recommendations of the Review Panel:

145. In light of the foregoing, pursuant to Article 17(5)(e) of the Convention, the Review Panel:
     
     a. Finds that the Decision to which objection has been presented unjustifiably discriminates in form or in fact against Russia;
     
     b. Finds that the alternative measures for 2023 adopted by Russia are equivalent in effect to the Decision to which objection has been presented, subject to the following specific modification recommended by the Review Panel:
     
     Russia will authorise vessels registered in Russia to fish for Trachurus murphyi in the Convention Area in 2023 only up to a catch limit fixed by Russia, which will not exceed 33,974 tonnes for all such vessels;
     
     c. Finds that all provisions of CMM 01-2023 that are not covered by Russia’s Objection, including in particular the TACs in paragraphs 4 and 9, remain binding upon Russia; and
     
     d. Finds, without prejudice to the foregoing, that the Decision to which objection has been presented by Russia is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Convention or other relevant international law as reflected in the 1982 Convention or the 1995 Agreement.

Findings and Recommendations, paragraph 145

For more information see PCA Case No. 2023-33.

A special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea was formed to deal with “the dispute concerning the M/T “Heroic Idun” and her crew” between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Republic of Equatorial Guinea (Order 2023/2 of 27 April 2023). The Parties agreed to transfer the arbitral proceedings instituted by the Marshall Islands under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to a special chamber of the Tribunal to be constituted pursuant to article 15, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Tribunal. See ITLOS Press Release 335. See also the press release from the Government of Equatorial Guinea (here). The context of the case leading to this transfer of proceedings can be found in previous De Maribus reports here, and here.

On 28 April 2023 the Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) formed to deal with the Dispute concerning the delimitation of the maritime boundary between Mauritius and Maldives in the Indian Ocean (Mauritius/Maldives) delivered its Judgment of 28 April 2023. This follows the previously reported Judgment of 28 January 2021 in the incidental proceedings concerning the preliminary objections raised by the Maldives. The operative part of the Judgment of 28 April 2023 unanimously concluded:

(1) Decides that the single maritime boundary delimiting the exclusive economic zones and the continental shelves of the Parties within 200 nm extends from west to east between the intersections of the respective 200 nm limits determined in paragraphs 248 and 250 above and is composed of geodetic lines connecting the following points in WGS 84 as geodetic datum: Point 1 with coordinates 2° 17′ 21.4″ S and 70° 11′ 56.2″ E; turning points 2 to 36 with the coordinates identified in paragraph 249 above; Point X (Point 37) with coordinates 3° 07′ 28.9″ S and 73° 19′ 11.0″ E; and Point Y (Point 38) with coordinates 3° 20′ 54.8″ S and 75° 12′ 52.1″ E.
(2) Finds that its jurisdiction to delimit the continental shelf between the Parties includes the continental shelf beyond 200 nm.
(3) Rejects the objection raised by the Maldives to the admissibility of Mauritius’ claim to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm on the grounds that Mauritius’ submission to the CLCS was not filed in a timely manner.
(4) Finds that, in the circumstances of the present case, it is not in a position to determine the entitlement of Mauritius to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in the Northern Chagos Archipelago Region and decides that, consequently, it will not proceed to delimit the continental shelf between Mauritius and the Maldives beyond 200 nm.

Dispute concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Mauritius and Maldives in the Indian Ocean, Judgment of 28 April 2023, para. 466.

Declarations to the Judgment of 28 April 2023 were attached by Judge Paik, Judge Heidar and Judge ad hoc Schrijver.

As previously reported, the ICJ would invite states entitled to appear before the ICJ and any international organisations likely to be able to furnish information to submit written statements in respect of Obligations of States in respect of climate change (Request for an Advisory Opinion). By Order of 20 April 2023, the ICJ:

1. Decides that the United Nations and its Member States are considered likely to be able to furnish information on the questions submitted to the Court for an advisory opinion and may do so within the time-limits fixed in this Order;
2. Fixes 20 October 2023 as the time-limit within which written statements on the questions may be presented to the Court, in accordance with Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute;
3. Fixes 22 January 2024 as the time-limit within which States and organizations having presented written statements may submit written comments on the written statements made by other States or organizations, in accordance with Article 66, paragraph 4, of the Statute; and Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

Obligations of States in respect of climate change (Request for an Advisory Opinion), Order of 20 April 2023 (emphasis added)

For more information see the case overview at General List No 187. Note, this Order is without prejudice to the possibility of the further addition of participants to the proceedings by authorisation of the ICJ. For example, this has occurred recently in response to a request from the African Union in other ongoing –but completely separate– ICJ Advisory Opinion proceedings (ICJ Press Release No. 2023/19).

Following previous reporting on the United Nations General Assembly’s request for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the obligations of States in respect of climate change, the advisory opinion request has been received by the ICJ Registrar on 17 April 2023 and added as General List No 187. Following receipt of the advisory opinion request, the Registrar of the ICJ will have notified all states entitled to appear before the ICJ and any international organisations likely to be able to furnish information of the request and invited said states and international organisations to submit written statements (ICJ Statute, Article 66). Said states and international organisations will also be invited to submit oral statements at public sittings to be determined at a later date. For more information see the ICJ Press Release No. 2023/20.

As previously reported, concerning the Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Tribunal) the President of the ITLOS issued an Order of 16 December 2022 inviting State Parties to UNCLOS, the COSIS and the other organizations listed in an annex to present written statements on the questions submitted to the Tribunal for an advisory opinion. 16 May 2023 was fixed as the time limit within which to present written statements. By Order of 15 February 2023, the President has extended this time-limit to 16 June 2023 within which written statements may be presented to ITLOS. The Order also notes that on 2 February 2023 the President of ITLOS affirmatively decided on a request from the African Union, which has now been invited to submit a written statement in addition to the previously invited organisations.

Following the previously reported Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by COSIS, on 16 December 2022 the President of the ITLOS issued an Order of 16 December 2022, the operative paragraphs providing:

Decides, in accordance with article 113, paragraph 2, of the Rules of the Tribunal, that the intergovernmental organization listed in the annex to the present order are considered likely to be able to furnish information on the questions submitted to the Tribunal for an advisory opinion;

Invites, in accordance with article 113, paragraph 3, of the Rules of the Tribunal, the State Parties to the Convention, the Commission and the other organizations referred to above to present written statements on the questions submitted to the Tribunal for an advisory opinion;

Fixes, in accordance with article 133, paragraph 3, of the Rules of the Tribunal, 16 May 2023 as the time limit within which written statements may be presented to the Tribunal;

Decides, in accordance with article 133, paragraph 4, of the Rules of the Tribunal, that oral proceedings shall be held;

Reserves the subsequent procedure for further direction.

Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by COSIS, Order of 16 December 2022.

For more information see the ITLOS Press Release.

By Order of 4 October 2022 in the Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia) the International Court of Justice issued a decision on the organisation of the public hearings. Having regard to Article 48 of the ICJ Statute and to Articles 54(1) and 61(1) of the Rules of Court the ICJ stated and decided that:

Whereas, in the circumstances of the case, before proceeding to any consideration of technical and scientific questions in relation to the delimitation of the continental shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured, the Court considers it necessary to decide on certain questions of law, after hearing the Parties thereon,

Decides that, at the forthcoming oral proceedings in the case, the Republic of Nicaragua and the Republic of Colombia shall present their arguments exclusively with regard to the following two questions:

(1) Under customary international law, may a State’s entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of its territorial sea is measured extend within 200 nautical miles from the baselines of another State?

(2) What are the criteria under customary international law for the determination of the limit of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured and, in this regard, do paragraphs 2 to 6 of Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea reflect customary international law? and

Reserves the subsequent procedure for further decision.

Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Order of 4 October 2022, pp. 2-3

As noted in both of the two declarations appended to the Order, the division of the oral proceedings on the merits into two separate parts was previously unprecedented. The Joint Declaration of Judges Tomka, Xue, Robinson, Nolte and Judge ad hoc Skotnikov offers critical reflection on the Order of 4 October 2022, while the Declaration of Judge Abraham is supportive of the Order of 4 October 2022. For further information see the ICJ Press Release No. 2022/49.

On 1 August 2022 the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered a Judgment in the Joined Cases C-14/21 and C-15/21 (Sea Watch eV v Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti and Others). The case concerned the division of powers between port states and flag states under EU law (Directive 2009/16; Italian domestic transposition (Legislative Decree No 53/2011)) and international law (UNCLOS; SOLAS; SAR Convention; IMO Resolution A.1138(31) and customary international law) in the context of Italia’s port state control of a German flagged cargo ships purported to be “systematically carrying out activities relating to the search for and rescue of persons at sea”. Law of the sea scholars may wish to consult the full text of the Judgment to view the Court’s interpretations of law of the sea instruments, in particular concerning the duty to render assistance at sea, as well as the interpretation of port state control under SOLAS and IMO Resolution A.1138(31) – which may have comparative application to other IMO and ILO conventions which utilise similar provisions, or fall under similar IMO guidance via IMO Resolution A.1138(31).

The operative part of the Judgment (para 160, emphasis added) held:

1. Directive 2009/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on port State control, as amended by Directive (EU) 2017/2110 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2017, must be interpreted as:

– applying to ships which, although classified and certified as cargo ships by the flag State, are in practice being systematically used by a humanitarian organisation for non-commercial activities relating to the search for and rescue of persons in danger or distress at sea; and

– precluding national legislation ensuring its transposition into domestic law from limiting its applicability only to ships which are used for commercial activities.

2. Article 11(b) of Directive 2009/16, as amended by Directive 2017/2110, read in conjunction with Part II of Annex I to that directive, as amended, must be interpreted as meaning that the port State may subject ships which systematically carry out search and rescue activities and which are located in one of its ports or in waters falling within its jurisdiction, having entered those waters and after all the operations relating to the transhipment or disembarking of persons to whom their respective masters have decided to render assistance have been completed, to an additional inspection if that State has established, on the basis of detailed legal and factual evidence, that there are serious indications capable of proving that there is a danger to health, safety, on-board working conditions or the environment, having regard to the conditions under which those ships operate.

3. Article 13 of Directive 2009/16, as amended by Directive 2017/2110, must be interpreted as meaning that, during more detailed inspections organised pursuant to that article, the port State has the power to take account of the fact that ships which have been classified and certified as cargo ships by the flag State are, in practice, being systematically used for activities relating to the search for and rescue of persons in danger or distress at sea in the context of a control intended to assess, on the basis of detailed legal and factual evidence, whether there is a danger to persons, property or the environment, having regard to the conditions under which those ships operate. By contrast, the port State does not have the power to demand proof that those ships hold certificates other than those issued by the flag State or that they comply with all the requirements applicable to another classification.

4. Article 19 of Directive 2009/16, as amended by Directive 2017/2110, must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event that it is established that ships which are, in practice, being systematically used for activities relating to the search for and rescue of persons in danger or distress at sea, despite having been classified and certified as cargo ships by a Member State which is the flag State, have been operated in a manner posing a danger to persons, property or the environment, the Member State which is the port State may not make the non-detention of those ships or the lifting of such a detention subject to the condition that those ships hold certificates appropriate to those activities and comply with all the corresponding requirements. By contrast, that State may impose predetermined corrective measures relating to safety, pollution prevention and on-board living and working conditions, provided that those corrective measures are justified by the presence of deficiencies which are clearly hazardous to safety, health or the environment and which make it impossible for a ship to sail under conditions capable of ensuring safety at sea. Such corrective measures must, in addition, be suitable, necessary, and proportionate to that end. Furthermore, the adoption and implementation of those measures by the port State must be the result of sincere cooperation between that State and the flag State, having due regard to the respective powers of those two States.

Sea Watch eV v Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti and Others, Judgment [160, emphasis added]

For more information see the CJEU Press Release No 138/22.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered judgment on Case C-700/20 (London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Limited v. Kingdom of Spain). This corresponds to a request for a preliminary ruling from the High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) (United Kingdom). The case relates to the Prestige sinking, and the CJEU found that arbitration proceedings initiated in the United Kingdom cannot block the recognition of the Spanish judgment ordering the insurer to pay compensation for the damage caused by the oil spill (see previous De Maribus report).

The CJEU held that Regulation No 44/2001 (on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial) must be interpreted as meaning that a judgment entered by a court of a Member State in the terms of an arbitral award cannot prevent, in that Member State, the recognition of a judgment given in another Member State where a judicial decision resulting in an outcome equivalent to the outcome of that award could not have been adopted by a court of the first Member State without infringing the provisions and the fundamental objectives of that regulation, in particular as regards the relative effect of an arbitration clause included in the insurance contract in question and the rules on lis pendens. In doing so, the Court ensures, in essence, that those provisions and fundamental objectives cannot be circumvented by means of arbitration proceedings followed by judicial proceedings seeking to have the terms of the arbitral award entered in a judicial decision.

The judgment (20 June 2022) may be found here and the Opinion of the Advocate General (5 May 2022) is available here. See also the CJEU press release.

On 21 April 2022 the ICJ delivered its Judgment on the merits, Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment. This Judgment was accompanied by 3 Dissenting Opinions (Judge Abraham; Judge Nolte; Judge ad hoc McRae) 4 Declarations (Vice-President Gevorgian; Judge Bennouna; Judge Xue; Judge Iwasawa) and 3 Separate Opinions (Judge Tomka; Judge Yusuf; Judge Robinson). Previously, the ICJ delivered its Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 17 March 2016 and the previous decisions on sovereignty over certain maritime features and maritime delimitation in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment of 19 November 2012 formed an integral part of the legal and geographic background to this case.

The Judgment of 21 April 2022 includes, among others, significant statements on the scope of the customary international law of the sea, the scope of coastal state rights in the contiguous zone, rights and duties concerning freedom of navigation and marine environmental protection, exceptionalism of historic fishing rights, and the scope of straight baselines and their relationship to other rights and duties in the law of the sea. The operative clause (paragraph 261, votes omitted) states:

THE COURT,
(1) By ten votes to five,
Finds that its jurisdiction, based on Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá, to adjudicate upon the dispute regarding the alleged violations by the Republic of Colombia of the Republic of Nicaragua’s rights in the maritime zones which the Court declared in its 2012 Judgment to appertain to the Republic of Nicaragua, covers the claims based on those events referred to by the Republic of Nicaragua that occurred after 27 November 2013, the date on which the Pact of Bogotá ceased to be in force for the Republic of Colombia;

(2) By ten votes to five,
Finds that, by interfering with fishing and marine scientific research activities of Nicaraguan-flagged or Nicaraguan-licensed vessels and with the operations of Nicaraguan naval vessels in the Republic of Nicaragua’s exclusive economic zone and by purporting to enforce conservation measures in that zone, the Republic of Colombia has violated the Republic of Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction in this maritime zone;

(3) By nine votes to six,
Finds that, by authorizing fishing activities in the Republic of Nicaragua’s exclusive economic zone, the Republic of Colombia has violated the Republic of Nicaragua’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction in this maritime zone;

(4) By nine votes to six,
Finds that the Republic of Colombia must immediately cease the conduct referred to in points (2) and (3) above;

(5) By thirteen votes to two,
Finds that the “integral contiguous zone” established by the Republic of Colombia by Presidential Decree 1946 of 9 September 2013, as amended by Decree 1119 of 17 June 2014, is not in conformity with customary international law, as set out in paragraphs 170 to 187 above;

(6) By twelve votes to three,
Finds that the Republic of Colombia must, by means of its own choosing, bring into conformity with customary international law the provisions of Presidential Decree 1946 of 9 September 2013, as amended by Decree 1119 of 17 June 2014, in so far as they relate to maritime areas declared by the Court in its 2012 Judgment to appertain to the Republic of Nicaragua;

(7) By twelve votes to three,
Finds that the Republic of Nicaragua’s straight baselines established by Decree No. 33-2013 of 19 August 2013, as amended by Decree No. 17-2018 of 10 October 2018, are not in conformity with customary international law;

(8) By fourteen votes to one,
Rejects all other submissions made by the Parties.

Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment [261].

See also the Summary 2022/3 (21 April 2022).

The Supreme Court of the Republic of Vanuatu decided on 10 December 2021 on the case between Vanuatu Ferry Limited and Republic of Vanuatu (Case No. 20/1901 SC/JUDR).

This was a claim for judicial review in relation to decisions by the Director of the National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) and Director of Immigration of Vanuatu to refuse entry into Vanuatu of the claimant’s vessel, the Vanuatu Cargo, a Vanuatu-flagged ship, and its crew. It was held that in the circumstances, the defendant’s refusal to permit food and water to be delivered to the vessel’s crew constituted a breach of its obligations under article 94 of UNCLOS to ensure the safety of crew members at sea and that, accordingly, it was unlawful. The defendant’s decisions also breached article 28 of the IHR.

The full judgment file is available here or here.